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Little is known theoretically, and even less empirically, about the relationship between firm boundaries 
and the allocation of decision rights within firms. We develop a model in which firms choose which 
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1 Introduction
The way organizational economists understand how efficient firms work and the way their
own discipline is organized presents a paradox. They generally agree that the diverse ele-
ments of organizational design — ownership and financing, reporting structures, task allo-
cations, compensation schemes, and the like — interact deeply with each other and must
work in concert for optimal performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Roberts, 2007). Yet,
the economics of firm organization itself is starkly split into separate divisions (Gibbons and
Roberts, 2013). There are theories of what determines the boundaries of the firm. Then there
are theories of how a firm organizes itself internally, for example in the degree to which de-
cisions are delegated from top- to mid-level managers. But how firm boundaries affect the
allocation of decision-making inside the firm, or the manner in which those allocations feed
back to the determination of boundaries, has scarcely been explored.
Notwithstanding these intellectual divides, decisions over integration and delegation are
clearly interdependent. Outside the firm boundaries, suppliers retain control over those pro-
duction decisions that cannot be guided by contract. Inside the boundaries, top management
not only has authority to dictate decisions, but can also choose whether and to whom to
delegate those decisions, often in response to information that arrives during the course of
production. Management can also decide to intervene and take control of the production de-
cisions of integrated suppliers, which is not an option if the suppliers are outside the firm
boundaries. Failure to align these two elements of organizational design correctly can be
disastrous: Boeing’s infamous Dreamliner fiasco is a stark illustration of the consequences of
underestimating these interdependencies.1
Although some studies have emphasized the conceptual difference between integration
and delegation (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1999; Hart and Holmström, 2010), there has
been little theoretical work to operationalize these differences. And, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no systematic empirical work along those lines. More broadly, as evidence
mounts that organization matters for the performance of whole industries and aggregate
1Boeing outsourced the design and manufacture of key components of the 787 Dreamliner (e.g., fuselage, wings,
avionics) to independent suppliers, reserving for itself only the roles of primary designer and final assembler.
This change in ownership structure meant that Boeing handed “complete control of the design of [each] piece
of the plane” to the suppliers. In sharp contrast to its prior practice of providing all designs and performing
intermediate as well as final assembly, Boeing now made each major supplier “responsible for managing its
own [small-component] subcontractors,” which “operated largely out of Boeing’s view.” This gave rise to
problems in design and compatibility and, according to company engineers, it was the main reason behind poor
quality components, strings of delays, and cost overruns of the 787 (Gates, 2013). By the time the first plane
was delivered, 40 months late, the company had incurred cost overruns estimated at over $10 billion (Zhao and
Xu, 2013). For a discussion of the Dreamliner case, see McDonald and Kotha (2015).
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economies as well as individual firms (e.g., Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2007; Alfaro, Charl-
ton, and Kanczuk, 2009; Forbes and Lederman, 2010; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012,
2016), it is becoming ever more imperative to understand the functioning of organizations as
a whole rather than just their parts.
In this paper, we bring integration and delegation together, both theoretically and empir-
ically. Building on earlier work by Legros and Newman (2013), we develop a theoretical
model that allows us to jointly study these “twin organizational” design decisions. We then
assess the evidence in light of the model, assembling a new dataset that contains information
on vertical integration2 (based on Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger and Newman, 2016), and dele-
gation (based on Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012) for a sample with thousands of firms
covering multiple countries and industries.
In our model, firm boundaries and the internal allocation of control are endogenous, the
result of optimizing behavior by a headquarters (HQ) producing a final good. HQ has an
exogenous “productivity,” interpretable as a measure of entrepreneurial ability, product de-
mand, or firm value. Production of the final good can use “generic” or “adapted” inputs.
Inputs (e.g., the seats in an airplane, or a section of its fuselage) are more valuable if they are
adapted to the final product (e.g., planes intended for sale to different carriers need different
seats, which in turn vary by class of service; fuselage parts must be mutually adjusted with
utmost precision in order to assemble a functioning aircraft). The nature and means of such
investments are often difficult to specify contractually, because they are complicated to fully
describe and often obscure until late in the course of production. Generic inputs rely only on
the supplier’s direction to produce, while adapted ones require coordinated investments by
both HQ and the supplier. The supplier has low variable stakes in the enterprise profit, but
bears the private costs of investments. If the transaction is at arms length, HQ has neither
contracts nor authority to see the investments through, so only the generic version of the in-
put is feasible. By contrast, if the supplier is integrated, HQ can exercise authority to elicit
adaptation investments from the supplier.3
HQ first chooses which of its suppliers to integrate. She is ex-ante uncertain about the
capability of suppliers to adapt inputs to her production needs and only learns this after she
2The logic of our theoretical model also applies to lateral integration, involving goods sold in separate markets
that are complementary either in production or consumption. However, data limitations make it difficult to
construct firm-level measures of lateral integration: this would require information on firms’ sales by product
line for narrowly defined industries, which we do not observe in our dataset.
3Indeed, part of Boeing’s remedial reorganization for the Dreamliner was to acquire some of its suppliers (e.g.
Vought, the supplier of rear fuselage assemblies) to have more direct control on the production of its inputs
(Tang and Zimmerman, 2009).
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has made the integration decision. At that point, she can decide which of the integrated
suppliers she will centralize, retaining control over their production decisions, and to which
of them she will delegate decision making. For non-integrated suppliers, by contrast, there
is little question of delegation: the supplier retains control as part of his bundle of ownership
rights. But his capability still plays a role, determining the value of the delivered generic
input.
Because the rights of ownership acquired by the HQ under integration include the au-
thority to delegate or centralize the adaptation process, integration has an option value. The
model predicts that HQ will choose to delegate decisions to integrated suppliers when they
are highly capable, and centralize otherwise. As a result, integration provides a form of
supply assurance: with non-integration, low capability suppliers deliver low-value generic
inputs; by allowing for the possibility of centralization, integration guarantees HQ at least a
moderate level of input value, no matter the supplier’s capability. Integration does come at a
cost, however, because of the adaptation investments.
Since non-contractibility prevents HQ from internalizing the supplier’s costs once the
relationship begins, when she retains control, she always chooses the maximum possible
adaptation investments for him, regardless of her own productivity or his capability. The
result is the oft-cited “rigidity” of centralized decision making. But with delegation, there is
an incentive problem, since HQ and the supplier have imperfectly aligned interests, leading to
imperfectly coordinated decisions. Higher productivity attenuates this incentive problem, as
the private costs of coordination weigh less heavily relative to the benefits in decision makers’
calculations. The rigidity of centralization and the “flexibility” of the incentive response
under delegation jointly imply that delegation will increase with the productivity of the HQ.
A more productive HQ also has stronger incentives to integrate suppliers. As HQ’s
productivity increases, integration becomes relatively more productive than non-integration
(both because adapted inputs are more valuable than generic ones, and because of the in-
centive response of delegation) and the costs of integration decline (because centralization
becomes less likely). For a more productive HQ, the efficiency gains of integration are thus
more likely to offset the costs, in line with the “value theory” of integration developed in
Legros and Newman (2013) and Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger and Newman (2016).
Both the propensity to integrate suppliers within the firm boundaries and the propensity
to delegate decisions to integrated suppliers should thus increase in the productivity of the
HQ, which yields our first testable prediction: integration and delegation should co-vary
positively, or equivalently integration and centralization should move in opposite directions.
This result underscores a fundamental conceptual distinction between delegation and non-
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integration. Delegation is a non-contractible act of relinquishing control that can in principle
be revoked at will by managerial fiat. Non-integration, by contrast, is the result of a formal
sale of assets (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1999). “One-dimensional” organizational mod-
els that focus on the allocation of control have a hard time distinguishing between complete
non-integration and complete delegation: both would seem to put decisions as far removed
from the “center” as possible. From the perspective of such models, it would seem that inte-
gration and delegation ought to covary negatively. Contrary to this presumption, our model
predicts a positive covariation between integration and delegation.4
A second prediction of our model is that final good producers should be more likely to
integrate suppliers in “riskier” input industries, in which productivity is more dispersed.
The intuition for this result is that, as we have already noted, integration creates a real option
(to keep control or not), and the greater the risk about the ability of the supplier to do the
adaptation, the more valuable the option becomes.
Finally, the value theory logic predicts that integration and delegation should depend on
the technological importance of the inputs: suppliers that contribute more to enterprise value
are more likely to be integrated. Among the integrated suppliers, more decisions will be
delegated to those which provide more important inputs.
We show that the predictions of the theoretical model are remarkably consistent with the
features of the novel dataset we have put together, which allows us to measure the extent of
delegation within firms as well as the degree of vertical integration. Data on delegation come
from the survey of Bloom, Sadun, Van Reenen (2012), who have interviewed plant managers
on the degree of autonomy granted to them by central headquarters. To measure vertical
integration, we use WorldBase, a plant-level dataset covering millions of firms in many coun-
tries, which allows to link plants belonging to the same firm via a common-ownership iden-
tifier. Using the methodology employed in Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger and Newman (2016),
we combine information on reported production activities with detailed input-output data to
measure the share of inputs used in the production of a firm’s final good that can be pro-
duced in house. Our matched sample consists of 2,661 firms, corresponding to 3,444 plants,
operating in 574 industries and 20 countries.
We find that plant-level delegation is robustly positively correlated with our measure of
firm-level vertical integration. Our estimates imply that moving vertical integration from
the 10th to the 90th percentile is associated with an increase in delegation by around 0.13
standard deviations. These results hold up in our baseline regressions and in a series of
4This result also holds true more broadly, including settings that allow for richer financial contracting possibili-
ties, renegotiation, and strategic interaction among suppliers (see Legros and Newman, 2015).
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robustness checks (e.g., including different sets of fixed effects and controls, using different
samples of firms).
To test the option-value prediction, we compute the coefficient of variation of labor pro-
ductivity of independent suppliers in each upstream-industry-country pair using information
from millions of plants in WorldBase. A higher coefficient of variation captures a more risky
productivity distribution of suppliers in an input industry, which according to our model
should increase the option value of integrating a supplier in that industry. In line with this
prediction, we find that the probability to vertically integrate a given input varies positively
and robustly with the riskiness of the productivity distribution of suppliers. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the coefficient of variation of suppliers’ labor productivity increases
the probability to vertically integrate a given input by around 39 percent. This finding is
extremely robust and holds for different sets of fixed effects and samples.
Our empirical results also confirm the role of the technological importance of the inputs
for integration and delegation choices. Using input-output coefficient to proxy for the im-
portance of each input, we find that final good producers are indeed more likely to integrate
suppliers of more important inputs, and to delegate more decisions to these suppliers.
We believe that our model is a plausible interpretation of the patterns we observe. We
discuss alternative theories that can only account for subsets of our empirical findings. We see
our model as a useful benchmark for understanding how elements of organizational design
that were previously considered separately may fit together in theory and practice.
Our work is related to two main streams of literature, which focus on each of the orga-
nizational choices we bring together in this paper. First, we build on the vast literature on
firm boundaries. Theoretical studies have looked at inter alia the technological/contractual
determinants of vertical integration (e.g., Coase, 1937; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Hart and Holmström, 2010). The view of
integration in our model is similar to that of Williamson (1975), and puts it in the “ex-post
non-contractible” branch of incomplete-contracts economics (e.g., the 2002 version of Hart
and Holmström, 2010; Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 2002; Legros and Newman, 2008,
2013; Dessein, 2014). Another strand has focused on market determinants (e.g., McLaren,
2000; Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Legros and Newman, 2008; Conconi, Legros and New-
man, 2012). In this vein, Legros and Newman (2013, 2017) develop a “value theory” of firm
boundaries, closely related to the model presented here, that emphasizes how product value
helps determine the propensity for firms to vertically or laterally integrate. Empirical studies
have tried to shed light on these determinants using firm-level data within specific industries
(e.g., Joskow, 1987; Woodruff, 2002; Baker and Hubbard, 2003; Hortaçsu and Syverson,
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2007), countries (e.g., Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffith and Zilibotti, 2010), or across countries
(e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009; Alfaro and Charlton, 2009; Alfaro, Conconi,
Fadinger and Newman, 2016). Recent contributions study integration decisions along value
chains (Antràs and Chor, 2013; Alfaro, Antràs, Chor, and Conconi, 2017).
Looking at the literature on delegation, we relate to some classic theoretical studies in-
cluding Aghion and Tirole (1997), Garicano (2000), Dessein (2002), Hart and Moore (2005),
Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008), Marin and Verdier (2008), Dessein, Garicano and
Gertner (2010). On the empirical side, important contributions include Acemoglu, Aghion,
Lelarge, Van Reenen, and Zilibotti (2007), Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), Bloom, Garicano,
Sadun and Van Reenen (2014) and Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012).
A number of papers have studied pairwise interactions of organizational design elements
from the theoretical point of view. Examples include Holmström and Tirole (1991); Holm-
ström and Milgrom (1991; 1994); Legros and Newman (2008, 2013); Dessein, Garicano, and
Gertner (2010); Rantakari (2013); Friebel and Raith (2010); Van den Steen (2010); Dessein
(2014), and Powell (2015). As far as we are aware, of these papers, only Baker, Gibbons,
and Murphy (1999) and Hart and Holmström (2010) consider delegation and firm boundaries
together, and only from a theoretical perspective.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section
3 describes the datasets and variables used in our empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the
empirical results. Section 5 offers some concluding comments, particularly on the implica-
tions of our findings for the theory of the firm.
2 The Model
2.1 Production
We consider a production process in which a final good j is produced with n inputs indexed
by i. An enterprise is composed of an HQ, who produces the final good, and n suppliers,
Si. HQ has “productivity” A > 0, an index of the profitability of her product appeal or
entrepreneurial ability. The value of the enterprise is
A
n∑
i=1
piij vi, (1)
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where the contribution piijvi of supplier i depends on the technologically determined impor-
tance of the input piij for producing good j, as well as the value vi generated by the supplier.
This value will depend partly on whether the input is adapted to HQ’s specific needs, the
result of an uncertain process that depends on the capabilities of the supplier and HQ as well
as on investments and production decisions that are determined by the organizational envi-
ronment, as discussed below. For now we will consider the relationship between HQ and a
typical supplier and suppress the index notation.
Inputs can either be generic or adapted. If the input is generic, the value generated by the
supplier is v = y, where y ≥ 0 is his “capability,” a random variable with distribution F (y)
and Ey ≤ 1 (E is the expectation operator). A generic input therefore contributes value Apiy
to the enterprise.
For an input to be adapted, the supplier must first make a fixed investment at private cost
φ. For example, he may go through lengthy meetings and plant visits to learn about specific
features of the final good, take training courses that instill the final good producer’s brand
or reputation, or simply move to the HQ’s premises. After the investment, the adaptation
process itself involves actions, such as design and process modifications in response to prob-
lems, that are performed by the supplier (s ∈ [0, 1]) and by HQ (h ∈ [0, 1]). These need
to be coordinated for adaptation to be successful. To model the coordination problem, we
follow Legros-Newman (2013), and suppose that adaptation succeeds (yields a return) with
probability p(s, h) = 1 − (s − h)2, and fails (yields zero) otherwise. HQ and the supplier
have opposing preferences about how to carry out adaptation and find it costly to accommo-
date the other’s approach (this could be due to differences in background, technologies, or
“vision,” possibly arising from the fact that they are in different industries). Specifically, HQ
has private cost (1− h)2, while the supplier has private cost cs2 (c > 0). Hence, HQ prefers
the decision to be close to h = 1, while the supplier likes the adaptation decision to be close
to s = 0. Typically, we would expect c to be small, as HQ’s practices or brand identity would
matter more than that of a small component of her product.
The value of the adapted input depends on who decides which actions to perform. HQ
has a capability that we normalize to 1, thereby weakly exceeding, on average, the capability
of the supplier. If HQ chooses the action s as well as h, the expected contribution from
the adapted input is Apip(s, h). However, if the supplier chooses s, the expected value is
Apiyp(s, h), reflecting his capability y.5 Summarizing, let D (for delegation) be the indicator
5We do not consider the case in which the supplier is permitted to choose h; this could be supposed to be
technologically infeasible, but it can also be shown that HQ would never choose to delegate the h decision to S
under the payoff and contractibility assumptions we make.
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function taking value 1 if the supplier chooses s for the enterprise, and value 0 if HQ does;
let I be the indicator whether the initial fixed investment is made. Then the expected supplier
contribution is
Ev = Ip(s, h)(Dy + 1− D) + (1− I)y.
2.2 Contracting and Timing
We assume that contracting is limited to fixed monetary payments and transfers of owner-
ship. In particular, payments contingent on adaptation decisions or outcomes are not possible
(e.g., because they are not observable or, if they are, they are not verifiable by third parties).
Moreover, only aggregate output, and not the (relatively small) contribution of individual
suppliers, is contractible, so that profit shares would provide no meaningful incentives. Nei-
ther the fixed investment, nor the adaptation decisions are contractible. Nor is the identity of
the decision maker (hence the delegation decision) contractible .
Ownership rights are contractible. If the supplier sells his asset to HQ, she gains the right
to impose the initial adaptation investment and choice s on the supplier. However, she also
has the (non-contractible) right to choose the control structure: she can choose whether to
centralize (choose s for the supplier) or delegate (let the supplier choose s).
It is assumed that all parties have payoffs denominated in monetary terms, and that all
have sufficient liquidity on hand to effectuate any side payments that might be needed to
satisfy the distributional requirements among them. Thus, the enterprise will be choosing the
organizational structure that maximizes the ex-ante total surplus.
Contracting occurs between HQ and all of the suppliers Si simultaneously. First, HQ
chooses the firm boundaries, by deciding which suppliers to integrate (the transfer can be
interpreted as the asset purchase price in this case). Crucially, when making this choice,
she does not yet know what their capabilities are, only the distributions Fi(y). She can then
invoke the authority garnered from ownership to force all integrated suppliers to make the
initial adaptation investment, but she has no such authority over the non-integrated ones.
After learning the capability of the suppliers, HQ can decide to which of the integrated ones
she delegates the adaptation process.6
The timing for a single HQ-supplier relationship is summarized as follows:
1. Contracting: integration decision and monetary transfer.
6Leaning about the capability of non-integrated suppliers may be possible, but is also useless, given that HQ
cannot force the initial adaptation investment on them.
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2. Adaptation investment choice at supplier cost φ.
3. Supplier capability y observed by HQ and S.
4. Delegation decision if the supplier is integrated.
5. s and h are chosen at costs cs2 and (1− h)2.
6. Output realized.
2.3 Ownership Structures
Non-Integration. The supplier has ownership of his asset and will never make the initial
adaptation investment, given that he bears the cost φ (which is non-contractible), while his
continuation value cannot depend on the success of adaptation (also non contractible).
Hence under non-integration there is no adaptation. It follows that the expected value Ev
to HQ of a non-integrated supplier (which is also equal to the total surplus, since the private
costs are zero) is given by
V N = ApiEy. (2)
Integration. Now HQ has ownership of the supplier’s asset and can impose the initial adap-
tation investment on him. Notice that she will always choose to do so, given that she does not
bear the cost φ and the investment has positive expected value.
Under integration, HQ can also decide whether to centralize the adaptation decisions
(s, h) or delegate them to her supplier. If HQ centralizes decision making, she will choose
s = h = 1: this will maximize the probability that adaptation succeeds, while minimizing
her private costs. The interim value to HQ of an integrated supplier under centralization is
vC(A, pi) = Api. (3)
By contrast, if HQ decides to delegate the direction of the adaptation process to the sup-
plier, by letting him choose s, she anticipates that he will set s = 0 (since this minimizes
his private costs and he has no financial stake in the outcome of the process). HQ will then
choose h to maximize Apiy(1− h2)− (1− h)2, which yields h = 1
1+Apiy
. It follows that the
interim value to HQ of an integrated supplier under delegation is
vD(A, pi, y) =
(Apiy)2
1 + Apiy
. (4)
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Notice that the function vD(A, pi, y) is supermodular, increasing, and strictly convex in A, pi
and y, as well as zero if any of its arguments is zero.
To decide whether to delegate, HQ compares vC(A, pi) with vD(A, pi, y). She will thus
delegate whenever the realized capability of the supplier exceeds a cutoff value y∗(Api) de-
fined by
vC(A, pi) = vD(A, pi, y∗(Api)). (5)
From (3) and (4), y∗(Api) is the unique positive solution to Api(y2 − y) = 1. It is (i) greater
than 1 (HQ’s capability) and (ii) decreasing in A.7 The reason for property (i) is that dele-
gation suffers from an incentive distortion, since HQ and the supplier make their decisions
independently, while centralization suffers relatively little (in this model, not at all) from in-
centive distortions. In order to compensate for the incentive loss, it takes a supplier capability
strictly higher than HQ’s to convince her to delegate. Property (ii) results from the relative
rigidity of centralization: the decision there is the same regardless of A (or pi), whereas with
delegation, decisions improve with firm value because of the incentive response (in this case
HQ’s). Thus, the value of delegation is more elastic with respect to A than is the value of
centralization, implying that an HQ with a higher A is more willing to delegate.
The probability of delegation conditional on integration is 1 − F (y∗(Api)). Since the
cutoff value y∗(Api) is decreasing, we have:
Lemma 1. The probability that HQ delegates decisions to an integrated supplier is increasing
in Api.
Anticipating the measure of delegation in our empirical analysis, which is continuous
rather than binary, suppose there are many tasks t ∈ {1, . . . , T} that need to be performed in
order to adapt the input. The lemma can be generalized as follows. On each task the capability
of the supplier is a random variable y + t, where y has distribution F and t are i.i.d., with
distribution G() and mean zero, while HQ has capability 1 on all tasks and can separately
delegate or retain control over each task. Each task contributes equally and additively to
the overall supplier value, and costs of decision on each task are weighted by 1/T . Then, the
capability xt ≡ y+t has distribution given by the convolutionC(xt) =
∫∞
0
G(xt−y)f(y)dy,
and we know from the previous analysis that the probability of delegation on task t is 1 −
C(y∗(Api)), increasing in A. The degree of delegation is the number or the fraction of tasks
that are delegated. It is a binomial random variable with parameters (1 − C(y∗(Api)), T ),
stochastically increasing in A. Hence, as A increases, the expected degree of delegation
7The second property is true for any function vD(A, pi, y) which is convex in A and increasing in A, y.
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increases (details in the Appendix).
Firm Boundary Choices
At the contracting stage, HQ determines whether to integrate each supplier S. The total
surplus of an integrated relationship is (returning now to the single-task-per-input version of
the model)
V I ≡ Emax[vC(A, pi), vD(A, pi, y)]− cF (y∗(Api))− φ. (6)
The first term Emax[vC(A, pi), vD(A, pi, y)] is the expected value accruing to HQ under in-
tegration. The remaining terms are the (expected) costs of integration. Both are borne di-
rectly by the supplier and include the centralization cost c, which is incurred with probability
F (y∗(A)), and the investment cost φ. In order for the supplier to agree to sell his asset, he
must be compensated for these costs via a monetary transfer at the time of contracting. Thus,
HQ will choose to integrate the supplier whenever V I ≥ V N . Combining (2) with (6), the
condition for integration can be written as
Emax[vC(A, pi), vD(A, pi, y)]− ApiEy ≥ cF (y∗(Api)) + φ. (7)
The left-hand side is the option value of integration, which is increasing in Api. While the
value of both ownership structures increase with Api, integration increases faster than non-
integration because of the incentive response under delegation.8 Meanwhile, since y∗(Api)
is decreasing, the integration cost on the right-hand side decreases in Api. It follows that the
propensity to integrate a supplier is increasing in the productivity A and in the technological
importance pi:
Lemma 2. (i) If an HQ in industry j with productivity A integrates a supplier in industry i
then an HQ in industry j with productivity A′ > A will also integrate a supplier in industry
i. (ii) holding F , c, and φ fixed across input industries, if an HQ in industry j integrates a
supplier from industry i, she also integrates suppliers from industries k for whom pikj > piij .
A corollary of result (i) is that the set of integrated suppliers will increase (in the set
inclusion order) as A increases. That is, if an HQ with productivity A integrates a set I(A) ⊂
8To see this, keep things simple by supposing pi is fixed at 1, and consider marginal increases in A.
Non-integration value increases by ∂AV N = Ey ≤ 1. The marginal increase in the integration return
Emax[vC(A, pi), vD(A, pi, y)] is F (y∗(A)) + (1 − F (y∗(A)))E|y≥y∗(A)[∂AvD(A, 1, y)]. Supermodularity of
vD ensures ∂AvD(A, 1, y) is increasing in y, so it is sufficient that ∂AvD(A, 1, y∗(A)) > 1 for the conditional
expectation, thus the marginal increase in integration revenue, to exceed 1 and therefore ∂AV N . But this last
condition follows from the definition of y∗(A), convexity in A, and vD(0, 1, y) = 0.
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{1, 2, . . . , n}, then, all else equal, an HQ with productivity A′ > A integrates a superset
I(A′) ⊇ I(A). We call the union {HQ} ∪ I a firm.
In the empirical analysis, the degree of vertical integration for a firm present in industry j
is the sum V I(A) ≡∑i∈I(A) piij . Lemma 2 (i) implies that the degree of vertical integration
is an increasing function of A. Since the degree of delegation is also an increasing function
of A, firms with a more productive HQ have stronger incentives both to integrate suppliers
and to delegate the adaptation process to them. We can thus state our first main result:
Proposition 1. The degree of delegation and the degree of vertical integration covary posi-
tively across firms.
Thus result generalizes straightforwardly to the case of multiple tasks (see the Appendix
for details).
2.4 Option Value of Integration
In our model, integration creates an option value. Namely, if the supplier turns out to be
of low capability (low y), the producer is able to ensure at least a minimal level of input
contribution by directing the production process herself. Such an option is not available
under non-integration wherein the producer is entirely reliant on the supplier’s capabilities.
Following intuition from real option theory, this observation suggests that riskiness of
suppliers will influence integration decisions. Consider a family of distributions {F (y;σ); σ ∈
[σ, σ]}, 0 < σ < σ <∞, where higher σ indicates greater Rothschild-Stiglitz riskiness, and
let Eσ denote the expectation operator when the distribution of y is F (y;σ).
The option value R(Api;σ) ≡ Eσmax[vC(A, pi), vD(A, pi, y)] − ApiEσy is increasing in
the risk σ, since the integrand of the first term is convex in y, while by definition the second
term is independent of risk. It follows that whenever ∂σF (y∗(Api);σ) is non positive, the
likelihood that the integration condition (7) is satisfied increases with σ, since the cost of
integration is falling along with its growing value. Since Eσy ≤ 1 < y∗(Api), this will be
the case for all single-crossing symmetric unimodal families of distributions (e.g., uniform,
triangular, normal, symmetric beta). For other families, cost also declines over some ranges
of σ, and even when it does not, integration increases with risk as long as the cost parameter
c is small enough.9
We can then state our second main result:
9Specifically, a sufficient condition when ∂σF (y∗(Api);σ) is positive is that c <
∂σR(Api;σ)
∂σF (y∗(Api);σ)
, which always
holds for some interval of positive costs (0, c), since ∂σR(Api;σ) and 1/∂σF (y∗(Api);σ) (and therefore their
product) are uniformly bounded away from 0 on [σ, σ]. For lognormal families with common means (where the
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Proposition 2. For single-crossing, symmetric, unimodal capability distributions or small
supplier cost parameters, if a supplier is integrated at risk σ, he will also be integrated at
risk σ′ > σ.
Our model thus suggests that an increase in risk in input industries should increase the
incentives of final good producers to integrate suppliers in those industries. In our empirical
analysis we will proxy the distribution of y by the empirical distribution of labor productivity
of suppliers who are not integrated.10 We will use the coefficient of variation of this distribu-
tion in each input industry to capture the degree of uncertainty in the ability of suppliers.11
2.5 Testable Predictions
We conclude this section by summarizing the key predictions of our model that we bring to
the data. The first testable prediction follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2:
P.1: More vertically integrated firms should have a higher degree of delegation.
P.2: Final good producers should have a higher propensity to integrate inputs when the
capability of suppliers in the input industry is more uncertain.
According to our model, delegation and integration decisions should also vary across sup-
pliers, depending on the technological importance of their inputs. A corollary of Lemma 1 is
that HQ should have stronger incentives to delegate decisions to suppliers of more important
inputs, i.e. with larger piij . The reason for this is that the cutoff value y∗(Apiij) is decreasing
in piij; then larger piij implies more delegation, just as larger A does. Similarly, Lemma 2 (ii)
implies that HQ should be more likely to integrate suppliers of more important inputs.
Our model thus delivers two additional predictions that we can bring to the data:
P.3: Final good producers should delegate more tasks to suppliers of more important
inputs.
P.4: Final good producers should be more likely to integrate suppliers of more impor-
tant inputs.
index σ is interpretable as the standard deviation of ln y; see Levy (1973)), for instance, there appears to be very
little variation, even when it is positive, in the probability of integration over a wide range of σ values consistent
with our data, implying that the small-cost condition is easily satisfied. Details available upon request.
10In the case of integrated suppliers, observed labor productivity will not only reflect their ability, but also the
productivity of HQ (A) and her organizational choice to delegate or centralize productive decisions.
11The effect of changes in the mean is ambiguous. Even if the distribution increases in the first order sense, so
that the integration cost on the right hand side of (7) decreases, the change in option value on the left hand side
is ambiguous because both Emax[vC(A, pi, y), vD(A, pi, y)] and ApiEy increase.
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3 Dataset and Variables
In this section, we first describe the datasets used in our empirical analysis. We then discuss
the construction of our matched sample and define the key variables.
3.1 Datasets
World Management Survey
Our international delegation data was collected in the context of the World Management
Survey (WMS), a large scale project aimed at collecting high quality data on organizational
design across firms around the world. The survey is conducted through interviews with plant
managers in medium sized manufacturing firms.
The WMS survey was conducted by telephone without telling the managers they were
being scored on organizational or management practices. This enabled scoring to be based
on the interviewer’s evaluation of the firm’s actual organizational practices, rather than their
aspirations, the manager’s perceptions or the interviewer’s impressions. Second, the inter-
viewers were not informed of the firm’s financial information or performance in advance of
the interview. This was achieved by selecting medium sized manufacturing firms and by pro-
viding only firm names and contact details to the interviewers (but no financial details). The
survey tool is thus “double blind” – managers do not know they are being scored and inter-
viewers do not know the performance of the firm. Third, each interviewer ran 85 interviews
on average, allowing for removal of interviewer fixed effects from all empirical specifications.
This helps to address concerns over inconsistent interpretation of responses. Fourth, infor-
mation on the interview process itself (duration, day-of-the-week), on the manager (seniority,
job tenure and location), and on the interviewer (for removing analyst fixed effects and sub-
jective reliability score) was collected. These survey metrics are used as “noise controls” to
help reduce residual variation.
The sampling frame was drawn from each country to be representative of medium sized
manufacturing firms. The main wave of interviews was run in the summer of 2006, followed
by smaller waves in 2009 and 2010.12
The WMS dataset contains around 10,000 plants in 20 countries. As discussed in de-
tail in Section 3.3 below, we use the survey to construct our delegation measure, as well as
12The survey achieved a 45% response rate, which is very high for company surveys, because (i) the interview
did not discuss firm’s finances, (ii) there were written endorsement of many institutions like the Bundesbank,
Treasury and World Bank, and (iii) high quality MBA-type students were hired to run the surveys.
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additional plant-level controls included in our regressions.
WorldBase
The other dataset used in our empirical analysis is the WorldBase by Dun & Bradstreet, which
provides coverage of public and private firms for more than 24 million plants in more than
200 countries and territories.13
The WorldBase dataset has been used extensively in the literature (e.g. Alfaro and Charl-
ton, 2009; Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009; Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger, and Newman
2016; Alfaro, Antràs, Chor, and Conconi, 2017).14 The unit of observation in the dataset is
the establishment/plant (namely a single physical location where industrial operations or ser-
vices are performed or business is conducted). Each establishment in WorldBase is identified
by a unique nine-digit sequence called Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number.
WorldBase also provides information about the year of establishment and the location of each
plant, its basic performance (employment, sales, etc.), as well as its primary and secondary
production activities, classified based on the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
Manual (1987 edition).
WorldBase allows us to trace ownership linkages between establishments. In particular,
for non-single establishment firms, we can use DUNS numbers to link all plants that have the
same domestic of global parent. D&B defines a parent as a corporation that owns more than
50 percent of another corporation. In our baseline regressions, we link all plants that have the
same domestic parent, as in Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger, and Newman 2016.15
In our analysis, we use the 2005 WorldBase dataset. When focusing on the 20 countries
that are also included in the WMS, this dataset contains 1,028,939 domestic ultimates. As
discussed below, we combine this dataset with information from Input-Output tables to con-
struct firm-level measures of vertical integration. We use the additional information provided
by WorldBase to construct auxiliary firm-level controls (e.g., employment, age).
13WorldBase is the core database with which D&B populates its commercial data products that provide in-
formation about the “activities, decision makers, finances, operations and markets” of the clients’ po-
tential customers, competitors, and suppliers. The dataset is not publicly available but was released
to us by Dun and Bradstreet. The sample was restricted to plants for which primary SIC code in-
formation and employment were available (due to cost considerations). For more information see:
http://www.dnb.com/us/about/db_database/dnbinfoquality.html.
14See Alfaro and Charlton (2009) for a detailed discussion of WorldBase and comparisons with other data sources.
15A “Domestic Ultimate” is a subsidiary within the global family tree which is the highest ranking member within
a specific country and is identified by a ”domuduns” code. A “Global Ultimate” is the top most responsible
entity within the global family tree and is identified by “gluduns” code. The two codes only differ in the case of
multinationals firms.
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3.2 Matched Sample
Combining WorldBase and the WMS, we construct a matched sample, which includes 2,661
firms in 20 countries, operating in 574 sectors (primary SIC codes of the firm), correspond-
ing to 3,444 plants.16 For the US and Canada we linked plants interviewed in the WMS to
plants in WorldBase using a common plant identifier (the DUNS number). For the remaining
countries, we did not have a common plant identifier available, so we used a string match-
ing algorithm to link plants in WMS to plants in WorldBase using location information and
company names. We then manually checked the results of the matching process. Finally, we
used ownership information from Worldbase to assign any matched plant to a firm via the
domestic parent.
Appendix Table A-1 presents summary statistics for all the variables used in our main
regressions, while Table A-2 reports the number of firms in each country.
3.3 Main Variables
Delegation
In the WMS, plant managers were asked four questions on delegation from the central head-
quarters to the local plant manager.17 First, they were asked how much capital investment
they could undertake without prior authorization from the corporate headquarters. This is a
continuous variable enumerated in national currency that is converted into dollars using PPPs.
Plant managers had then to state the degree of autonomy they had in three other dimensions:
(a) the introduction of a new product, (b) sales and marketing decisions, and (c) hiring a new
full-time permanent shop floor employee. These more qualitative variables were scaled from
a score of 1 (defined as all decisions taken at the corporate headquarters), to a score of 5
(defined as complete autonomy granted to the plant manager). Since the scaling may vary
across questions, we have standardized the scores from the four autonomy questions to z-
scores, by normalizing each question to mean zero and standard deviation one. The variable
Delegationf,p is the average across the four z-scores for plant p belonging to firm f .
16For the vast majority of cases, we only observe a single plant in WMS corresponding to a given firm in World-
base. In a number of instances, the same plant has been interviewed in more than one wave of the WMS. The
WMS sample excludes plants where the CEO and the plant manager were the same person (only 4.9% of the
interviews).
17In Appendix Figure A-1, we detail the individual questions in the same order as they appear in the survey.
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Vertical Integration
To measure vertical integration, we follow Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger and Newman (2016),
combining information from WorldBase on firms’ production activities with data from Input-
Output tables.
As mentioned above, the unit of observation in WorldBase is the establishment/plant, a
single physical location at which business is conducted or industrial operations are performed.
For each establishment, we use different categories of data recorded in WorldBase:
1. Industry information: the 4-digit SIC code of the primary industry in which each es-
tablishment operates, and the SIC codes of up to five secondary industries.
2. Ownership information: information about the firms’ family members (number of fam-
ily members, domestic parent and global parent).18
3. Location information: country of each plant.
4. Additional information: sales, employment, age.
We combine information on plant activities and ownership structure from WorldBase with
input-output data to construct a firm-level vertical integration index. The methodology used
to construct this measure is based on Fan and Lang (2000) and has been used in several
empirical studies on firm boundaries (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009; Alfaro,
Conconi, Fadinger, and Newman, 2016; Alfaro, Antràs, Chor, and Conconi, 2017). Given
the difficulty of finding highly disaggregated input-output matrices for all the countries in our
dataset, we follow Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) and Alfaro and Charlton (2009) in
using the U.S. input-output tables to provide a standardized measure of input requirements
for each output sector. U.S. input-output (IO) tables should be informative about input flows
across industries to the extent that these are determined by technology.19
The input-output data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Benchmark IO
Tables, which include the make table, use table, and direct and total requirements coefficients
tables.20
18D&B also provides information about the firm’s status (joint-venture, corporation, partnership) and its position
in the hierarchy (branch, division, headquarters).
19The assumption that the U.S. IO structure carries over to other countries introduces some measurement error in
the construction of the vertical integration index defined below, which can bias our empirical analysis against
finding a significant relationship between delegation and integration. Moreover, using U.S. IO tables to construct
vertical integration indices for other countries mitigates the possibility that the IO structure is endogenous.
20We use the Use of Commodities by Industries after Redefinitions 1992 (Producers’ Prices) tables. While the
BEA employs six-digit input-output industry codes, WorldBase uses the SIC industry classification. We convert
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For every pair of industries, ij, the input-output accounts provide the dollar value of i
required to produce a dollar’s worth of j. By combining information from WorldBase on
firms’ activities with U.S. input-output data, we construct the input-output coefficients for
each firm f with primary activity j, IOfij . Here, IO
f
ij ≡ IOij ∗ Ifi , where IOij is the direct
requirement coefficient for the sector pair ij (i.e., the dollar value of i used as an input in
the production of one dollar of j) at the 4-digit SIC level and Ifi ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator
variable that equals one if and only if firm f owns plants that are active in sector i. A firm
with primary activity j that reports i as a secondary activity is assumed to supply itself with
all the i it needs to produce j.
To verify the first prediction of our model, we construct a firm’s integration index:
Vertical Integrationf,j =
∑
i
IOfij, (8)
which is the sum of the IO coefficients for each input industry in which firm f is active. This
index measure the fraction of inputs used in the production of a firm?s final good that can
be produced in house.21 In the case of multi-plant firms, we link the activities of all plants
that report to the same headquarters and consider the main activity of the headquarters as the
primary sector.
As an illustration of the procedure used to construct the vertical integration index, con-
sider an example, taken from Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger, and Newman (2016), of a Japanese
shipbuilder that reports two secondary activities, Fabricated Metal Structures (SIC 3441) and
Sheet Metal Work (SIC 3444). The IOij coefficients for these sectors are:
Output (j)
Input (i)
Ships
Ships 0.0012
Fab. Metal 0.0281
Sheet Metal 0.0001
The table is just the economy-wide IO table’s output column for the firm’s primary industry,
Ship Building and Repairing (3731/61.0100), restricted to the input rows for the industries
the IO table to the 4-digit SIC 1987 classification, using the concordance guide provided by the BEA. For codes
for which the match is not one-to-one, we have randomized between possible matches. The multiple matching
problem, however, is not particularly relevant when looking at plants operating in the manufacturing sector (for
which the key is almost one-to-one).
21Alternatively, we could normalize input-output coefficients by the total sector-specific intermediate share to
make them sum to unity for each sector. Since we include output-sector fixed effects in our empirical specifica-
tions, such sector-specific normalization is absorbed by the fixed effects.
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in which it owns a plant (or reports a secondary activity). The IOij coefficient for fabricated
metal structures to ships is 0.0281, indicating that 2.8 cents worth of metal structures are
required to produce a dollar’s worth of ships. The firm is treated as self-sufficient in the listed
inputs but not any others, so its vertical integration index Vertical integrationf is the sum of
these coefficients, 0.0294: about 2.9 cents worth of the inputs required to make a dollar of
primary output can be produced within the firm.22
To assess the validity of the second prediction of our model, we also construct the dummy
variable Integrationf,j,i,c, which is equal to 1 if firm f (producing primary output j and with
a domestic ultimate located in country c) integrates a supplier in input industry i within its
boundaries. To keep the analysis tractable, we limit the sample to firms that integrate at least
one input different from their primary output j, and to the top 100 inputs i used by j, as
ranked by the IO coefficients (see also Alfaro, Antràs, Chor, and Conconi, 2017).
To test predictions 3 and 4, we use the variable IOij , the input-output coefficient (direct
requirement coefficient) at the 4-digit SIC level for the sector pair ij taken from the US
input-output tables.
Riskiness of Input Industries
To assess the validity of the second prediction of our model, we need to verify how uncer-
tainty in the productivity of suppliers in an input industry affects a firm’s integration choices.
To identify the relevant inputs, we again use the input-output data from the BEA. For every
firm f producing good j located in country c, we focus on the top 100 inputs i as ranked by
the IO coefficients IOij .
It is well known that if distributions are lognormal with a common mean, greater risk in
the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense is equivalent to a higher coefficient of variation (Levy, 1973).
Given that the distribution of productivity of input suppliers approximately follows a lognor-
mal distribution, we can make use of this observation in the empirical analysis by constructing
the variables CV Productivityi,c, the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) of pro-
ductivity of suppliers in input industry i located in country c, and Mean Productivityi,c, the
arithmetic average of suppliers’ productivity. We construct these variables using informa-
tion on the labor productivity of all independent (i.e., non-integrated) firms.23 We consider
22Many industries, including Ship Building and Repairing, have positive IOjj coefficients: some “ships” are used
to ferry parts around a shipyard or are actually crew boats that are carried on board large ships; machine tools
are used to make other machine tools; etc. As a result, firms will be measured as at least somewhat vertically
integrated. To control for this, in the empirical analysis, we will include output industry fixed effects.
23As mentioned before, in the case of an integrated supplier, his observed labor productivity will not only reflect
his ability (yi), but will also how productive HQ is (A) and whether or not she delegates the adaptation decision
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all suppliers present in the 20 countries considered by the WMS using the full WorldBase
dataset (around 15 million independent firms) with primary sector i located in country c.
In some robustness checks, we restrict the analysis to input industries in which we have
at least 50 independent suppliers in industry i country c to construct CV Productivityi,c or
construct the uncertainty measure after winsorizing labor productivity at the 5th and 95th
percentile.
Testing our model’s predictions requires measures that capture the difficulty to assess
the quality of suppliers in an input industry i, which is fixed but ex-ante unknown (rather
than measures capturing stochastic supplier’s quality, which is fully observable but keeps
changing over time). The advantage of using the measure CV Productivityi,c is that it can be
constructed at the SIC 4 level for all the 20 countries in our sample. We also experiment with
two alternative measures capturing cross-sectional variation in firm performance within SIC
4 industries. These variables are taken from Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta, and Terry
(2018) and are only available at the SIC4 level for the United States and for manufacturing
inputs. The first is SD Stock Returnsi, which is the cross-sectional standard-deviation of
the mean annual return for each firm within each input industry. The second is SD Output
Growthi, which is the cross-sectional standard-deviation of real sales growth in each input
industry.24
Additional Controls
Using information from WorldBase, we construct auxiliary firm-level controls. These include
Employmentf , the total number of employees of the firm, and Agef , the number of years since
its establishment. Labor Productivityf , which measures sales per worker of the parent firm.
The auxiliary plant-level controls drawn from the WMS data include the number of em-
ployees of the plant (Employmentp), and the education of the workforce, defined as the per-
centage of a plant’s employees who have a bachelor’s degree or higher (% Workforce with
College Degreep). In some specifications, we also control for a plant’s adoption of basic
management practices, using the methodology developed in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)
and extended in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2016). Figure A-2 in the Appendix lists
these practices and gives a sense of how each was measured on a scale from 1 to 5. Our
to the supplier (see footnote 10). Transfer pricing incentives may also distort the measure of labor productiv-
ity for integrated suppliers. Nevertheless, we have verified that our results are robust to including integrated
suppliers in the construction of the measure CV Productivityi,c.
24The data for these variables are available on-line at http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/RUBC.zip.
We use data for 2005, the same year as our WorldBase dataset.
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overall measure of the quality of a firm’s management practices, Managementp, is simply the
average of the 18 individual management dimensions, after each has been normalized to a
z-score (with a mean of zero and a standard-deviation of one).25
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Delegation Choices
We first assess the validity of prediction P.1 concerning the relationship between delegation
and integration. According to our model, firms with a more productive HQ will have stronger
incentives both to integrate suppliers and to delegate the adaptation process to them. As a
result, the two organizational variables should be endogeneously correlated.
A first look at the data suggests that more vertically integrated firms tend indeed to dele-
gate more decisions to their plant managers (see binned scatterplot of Figure 1).26
Figure 1: Delegation and Vertical Integrationgraph2 3/29/18, 6:57 AM
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25In some specifications, we have also used the individual components of the plant’s management practices:
Operationsp, which measures the adoption of lean management practices; Monitoringp, which measures the
adoption of practices related to performance monitoring and review; Targetsp, which measures the adoption of
practices related to targets setting and review; and Incentivesp, which measures the adoption of practices related
to the management of human capital, including monetary and non-monetary incentives.
26Figure 1 is created by grouping Vertical Integration into 40 equal-sized bins, computing the mean of the Vertical
Integration and Delegation variables within each bin, then creating a scatterplot of these data points.
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To more systematically assess the first prediction of our model, we estimate the following:
Delegationf,p,i,j,c = β1 Vertical Integrationf,j,c+ β2Xp+ β3Xf + δi+ δj + δc+ f,p,i,j,c. (9)
The dependent variable is the degree of autonomy granted to plant p (with primary activity
i, located in country c) by the parent firm f (with primary activity j, located in country c).
The main control of interest is Vertical Integrationf,i,c, the vertical integration index of firm
f . According to the first prediction of our theoretical model, the estimated coefficient β1
should be positive and significant. Xp andXf are vectors of plant- and of firm-level controls,
while δi, δj and δc are input-sector, output-sector (at the 3-digit SIC level), and country fixed
effects.27 We include input-sector (output-sector) fixed effects to control for the average
amount of delegation to a given input industry (by a given output industry).28 We cluster
standard errors at the firm level.
The results of estimating (9) are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 1. Column 0 presents
the results of the most parsimonious specification, in which we simply regress Delegationf,p,i,j,c
against our key control of interest, Vertical Integrationf,j,c, without including any other con-
trols. In line with prediction P.1 of our model, the estimated coefficient of Vertical Integrationf
is positive and significant (at the five-percent level). In column 1 we add country and input-
industry fixed effects. Again, the estimated coefficient of interest is positive and significant
(at the one-percent level). This result continues to hold when we further include output-
industry fixed effects (column 2), and control for the size and age of the parent firm, as well
as the size and level of education of the plant’s workforce (column 3).29
In terms of quantitative implications, the point estimates reported in column 2 of Ta-
ble 1 indicate that, as we move from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile of Vertical
Integrationf , delegation increases by around 0.13 standard deviations.30
27Given that the data on delegation were collected in different waves of surveys and by different interviewers,
we also include in these regressions survey noise controls and fixed effects for the year in which the firm was
surveyed to reduce measurement error in the dependent variable.
28For the vast majority of firms, we observe delegation for a single plant, so we cannot include firm fixed effects.
29The variables % Workforce with College Degreep and Employmentp are missing for a few plants. To avoid
dropping observations, in the specifications in which we include these variables, we replace missing values with
-99 and use a dummy variable to control for these instances.
30The 10th percentile of Vertical Integrationf is 0.006 and the 90th percentile is 0.198, thus (0.198-
0.006)*0.691=0.132.
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Table 1
Delegation Choices
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vertical Integrationf 0.540** 0.794*** 0.691*** 0.554** 0.754*** 0.628** 0.473*
(0.220) (0.244) (0.250) (0.249) (0.245) (0.254) (0.253)
log(Employmentf ) -0.086** -0.100**
(0.042) (0.044)
log(Agef ) 0.035* 0.048**
(0.021) (0.022)
log(Employmentp) 0.111*** 0.113***
(0.023) (0.023)
log(% Workforce with College Degreep) 0.055*** 0.056***
(0.016) (0.017)
IOij 0.862** 0.852* 0.949**
(0.372) (0.449) (0.444)
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Input FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Noise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,444 3,444 3,444 3,444 3,179 3,179 3,179
Notes: The dependent variable is Delegationf,p,i,j,c, the degree of autonomy granted to plant p (with primary activity i, located in country c) by the parent
firm f (with primary activity j). Vertical Integrationf,j,c is the vertical integration index of firm f . Employmentf measures the firm’s employment, Agef is
the number of years since its establishment, Employmentp is the plant’s employment, and % Workforce with College Degreep is the percentage of the plant’s
employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher. IOij is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j. Output and input fixed
effects are respectively the primary activities of the parent and of the plant (defined at 3-digit SIC). Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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It should be stressed that the positive coefficient of Vertical Integrationf should not be
interpreted in a causal sense, i.e., more integration leading to more delegation. Rather, our
model suggests that integration and delegation choices are endogenously correlated, because
firms that have a more productive HQ (higher A) have stronger incentives to integrate suppli-
ers and delegate production decisions to them.31
To verify how the technological importance of an input affects delegation choices, we
further include in regression (9) the input-output coefficient IOij . The results are reported in
columns 4-6 of Table 1. Across all specifications, the coefficient of IOij is positive and highly
significant. This confirms prediction P.3, according to which final good producers should be
more likely to delegate decisions to suppliers of more important inputs.32 In terms of mag-
nitude, based on the estimates reported in column 5, increasing the input-output coefficient
by one standard deviation increases delegation by around 0.05 standard deviations.33 Notice
that the coefficient of Vertical Integrationf remains positive and significant, confirming that
more integrated firms give more autonomy to their suppliers, in line with prediction P.1.34
Concerning the auxiliary controls in Table 1, we find that firms delegate more when their
plant is larger and has a more educated workforce, a result that continues to hold in all the
robustness checks we have carried out on the delegation results. The coefficients of the
firm-level variables log(Employmentf ) and log(Age)f are significative (negative and positive,
respectively) in Table 1, but their sign and significance is not always robust.
We have carried out a series of additional robustness checks to verify the validity of
predictions P.1 and P.3. The results are reported in the Appendix. First, the coefficients of our
key variables of interest, Vertical Integrationf and IOij , remain positive and significant when
we use more disaggregated industry fixed effects (defined at the SIC4 level instead of SIC3)
to control for the primary activities of the plant and its parent firm (see Table A-3).35
Second, the results of Table 1 are robust to restricting the analysis to the 10 largest coun-
tries in our sample, i.e. those that have the highest number of firms (see Table A-4).
Third, the results of Table 1 continue to hold when controlling for labor productivity of
31If we had a good proxy for the exogeneous ability of the HQ, we could include it as a control when estimat-
ing (9). Based on our theory, the correlation between delegation and vertical integration should then become
insignificant. As discussed at the end of this section, in some of the robustness checks, we control for labor
productivity of the parent firm. However, this is a not a good proxy for A, among other reasons because it is
contaminated by y, the realized capability of suppliers.
32Following the same specifications as in columns 1-3, we have clustered standard errors at the firm level. Results
are practically identical if we cluster at the industry-pair level (the level of variation of the IO coefficient).
33The standard deviation of IOij is 0.05, so 0.852*0.055=0.047.
34As expected given the positive correlation between IOij and Vertical Integrationf , the magnitude of the coeffi-
cient of the overall vertical integration index drops slightly when we control for the input-output coefficient.
35The main drawback is that we lose some observations, which are absorbed by the fixed effects.
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the parent firm (see A-5). Notice that the coefficients of Vertical Integrationf and IOij remain
positive and significant. The coefficient of Productivityf is positive but not significant. Recall
that, according to our model, the reason why delegation and vertical integration should be
correlated is that both should be increasing in A, which captures exogenous characteristics of
the HQ that increase the profitability of the enterprise (e.g., product appeal, entrepreneurial
ability of the CEO). The results of Table A-5 suggest that nominal labor productivity of the
parent firm is a poor proxy for A, the underlying productivity of the HQ. Our model suggests
that one reason for this is that the measure of labor productivity of the firm also reflects y, the
realized capability of suppliers.
Finally, one may be concerned about measurement error in the vertical integration index.
In an influential study, Atalay, Hortaçsu, and Syverson (2014) find little evidence of intra-firm
shipments between related plants within the United States. This suggests that using Fan and
Lang (2000)’s methodology to construct Vertical Integrationf may lead us to mis-classify
some inputs as being integrated, when the firm is actually sourcing them from the market.
Random measurement error in the vertical integration index should work against us, by at-
tenuating the coefficient β1, making it harder to find support for prediction P.1. Nevertheless,
we have verified that the positive relationship between delegation and vertical integration
holds even when we restrict the analysis to single-plant firms (see Table A-6).36 For these
firms, measurement error in the vertical integration index should be less of a concern, since
it is unlikely that a parent would not use the inputs produced in its own establishment.
4.2 Integration Choices
In our model, ex-ante uncertainty about suppliers’ capability creates an option value of in-
tegration, because HQ can decide whether and to which suppliers to delegate decisions. In
this section, we focus on integration choices, which occur before capability realizations and
delegation decisions.
According to prediction P.2 of our model, final good producers should be more likely to
integrate inputs when the capability of suppliers in the upstream sector is more uncertain. A
first look at the data suggests that the likelihood that a producer integrates a particular input
36In these regressions, we do not include IOij : in the small sample of single-plant firms, the correlation between
IOij and Vertical Integrationf is 0.4523 (instead of 0.2522 in our main sample), so there is little variation in
the importance of integrated inputs, once we control for Vertical Integrationf and industry fixed effects. Notice
also that we can only include one set of industry fixed effects (given that the primary SIC code of the parent
firm coincides with the primary SIC code of the plant) and one employment variable (given that the number of
employees of the plant and the firm are the same).
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increases with the uncertainty in suppliers’ productivity in the input industry (see Figure 2).37
Figure 2: Integration Probability and Riskiness of Input Industry
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To more systematically assess the validity of the second prediction of our model, we
estimate the following linear probability model:
Integrationf,j,i,c = γ1 CV Productivityi,c+γ2 Mean Productivityi,c+γ3 Xf +δi+δf + f,j,c,i.
(10)
The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i,c, which is equal to 1 if firm f (with primary activity
in sector j and located in country c) integrates input i within its boundaries. The key control
of interest is CV Productivityi,c, which captures the degree of uncertainty in the capability of
suppliers faced by the firm ex-ante, before deciding whether or not to integrate a particular
input. As explained in Section 3.3, this variable is constructed using information on the labor
productivity of all independent firms with primary sector i in country c. We control for Mean
Productivityi,c, the mean of suppliers’ productivity in each country-input-sector; given the
approximate lognormality of productivity distributions, this ensures that CV Productivityi,c
orders distributions by risk in the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense. Xf is a vector of firm-level
controls, while δi denotes input-industry fixed effects at the 4-digit SIC level. In the most
demanding specifications, we include firm fixed effects (δf ), which allow us to account for
the role of unobservable firm characteristics. In alternative specifications, we replace firm
37Figure 2 is created by grouping CV productivity into 40 equal-sized bins, computing the mean of the CV pro-
ductivity and Delegation variables within each bin, then creating a scatterplot of these data points.
26
fixed effects with output-sector and country fixed effects (δj and δc). We cluster standard
errors at the input-industry i level, since the main variable of interest varies at the input-
industry-country level.
According to prediction P.2 of our model, the estimated coefficient of CV Productivityi,c
should be positive and significant. Greater uncertainty in suppliers’ productivity implies
that by integrating an input, the firm has a better chance to benefit from high productivity
through delegation, while being insulated from low productivity through centralization. In
other words, greater uncertainty increases the option value of integration, making integration
more likely. Notice that, it is the possibility of delegation that generates the option value of
integration. However, ex-post (realized) delegation (which is what our survey data measures)
cannot have a causal impact on integration, and thus is not included in our regressions.
The baseline results are reported in columns 1-4 of Table 2. We include the 2,661 firms in
the matched sample and consider the top 100 inputs (based on the IO coefficients) necessary
to produce the firm’s output (see also Alfaro, Antràs, Chor, and Conconi, 2017).38 We first
specification includes only our key control of interest, CV Productivityi,c (column 0). We then
further add country and input fixed effects (column 1), output fixed effects (column 2), and
additional firm-level controls (column 3).39 In the last specification, we include firm fixed
effects, exploiting only within-firm variation across inputs to identify how the riskiness of
suppliers affects integration choices (column 4).40
In all specifications, the estimated coefficient for CV Productivityi,c is positive and highly
significant. This finding is consistent with prediction P.2 of our model, according to which
higher uncertainty in the productivity of suppliers should increase the option value of integra-
tion. As for the economic magnitude of the effect, based on the specification in column 2, a
one-standard-deviation increase in CV Productivityi,c increases the probability of integrating
with a supplier by around 0.27 percentage points, which corresponds to a 27 percent increase
compared to the baseline probability of one percent.41 Concerning the auxiliary controls, we
find that the propensity to integrate inputs is higher in firms that are larger and have a less
educated workforce.
38The unit of observation in these regressions is the firm-input level. Notice that number of observations is
249,471, which is less than 2,661 firms * 100 inputs = 266,100. This is because there are not enough firms by
country-sector to construct CV Productivityi,c for each country-sector pair.
39Only the fraction of the workforce with a college degree is from the WMS and collected at the plant level.
40In this specification, country and output-industry fixed effects are absorbed by the firm fixed effects, given that
each firm is associated to one location and one primary activity.
41The standard deviation of CV Productivityi,c is 4.685. Thus, 0.267=0.00057*4.685*100.
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Table 2
Integration Choices
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CV Productivityi,c 0.00076*** 0.00062*** 0.00057*** 0.00057*** 0.00056*** 0.00062*** 0.00057*** 0.00056*** 0.00056***
(0.00017) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00015)
log(Employmentf ) 0.00671*** 0.00672***
(0.00040) (0.00040)
log(1+ Agef ) -0.00007 -0.00009
(0.00028) (0.00028)
IOij 0.07702*** 0.12626*** 0.12829*** 0.13752***
(0.01188) (0.01495) (0.01485) (0.01592)
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes -
Input FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No No Yes Yes - No Yes Yes -
Firm FE No No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471
Notes: The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i,c, a dummy equal to 1 if firm f (producing final product j and located in country c) integrates input i within its boundaries. CV Productivityi,c
is the coefficient of variation of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i located in country c. Employmentf measures firm employment, and Agef is the number of years
since the firm’s establishment. IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j. All regressions include Mean Productivityi,c as a control. Standard errors
clustered at the input level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
28
To assess the validity of prediction P.4 of our model, in columns 5-8 of Table 2 we re-
estimate the linear probability model (10) including the input-output coefficient as a covariate.
Across all specifications, IOij is positive and significant, confirming that final good produc-
ers are more likely to produce in house more important inputs. In particular, according to
the specification in column 6, moving the input-output coefficient by one standard deviation
increases the probability to vertically integrate the supplier of this input by 0.44 percentage
points – a 44 percent increase compared to the baseline probability of one percentage point.42
The coefficient of CV Productivityi,c remains positive and significant, in line with the predic-
tion P.2 of our model.
We have carried out a series of additional robustness checks to verify the validity of
predictions P.2 and P.4. The results are reported in the Appendix. First, we have verified
that the results of Table 2 continue to hold if we construct the uncertainty measure after
winsorizing labor productivity at the 5th and 95th percentile (see Table A-7).
Second, we have restricted the analysis to input industries in which there are at least 50
suppliers in each input industry-country, for which CV Productivityi,c can be measured more
precisely. The results confirm that producers are more likely to integrate suppliers when they
face more uncertainty about their capability and when they produce more important inputs
(see Table A-8).
Third, we have verified that the results of Table 2 are robust to using different samples
of firms and countries. The coefficients of our key variables of interest, CV Productivityi,c
and IOij , remain positive and significant if we restrict the analysis to the 10 largest countries
in our sample (see Table A-9), and when we use the larger WorldBase sample (see Table
A-10).43
Fourth, as mentioned before, the results of Atalay, Hortaçsu, and Syverson (2014) suggest
that using the methodology of Fan and Lang (2000) may lead us to mistakenly classify some
inputs as being sourced from plants owned by the parent, whereas they are actually bought
on the market. In the regressions of Table 2, this would imply a measurement error in the
dependent variable Integrationf,j,i,c. In turn, this should make our coefficient estimates less
precise, making it harder to find support for our model’s predictions. The coefficient for CV
42The standard deviation of IOij is 0.035. Thus, 0.126*0.035*100=0.441.
43In this robustness check, we include in our analysis all parent firms in the WorldBase dataset that i) have a
primary SIC code in manufacturing (between SIC 2000 and 3999), ii) have integrated at least one input different
from their primary SIC code, iii) are located in the same 20 countries as the firms in the matched sample, and iv)
have at least 20 employees. This gives us 67,106 parent firms. When running regression (10) on this sample, we
cannot include the variable log(% Workforce with College Degreep), which comes from the World Management
Survey and is thus only available for firms in the matched sample.
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Productivityi,c is always positive and highly significant. Nevertheless, we have verified that
the results continue to hold when we restrict the analysis to all single-establishment firms
in WorldBase, for which measurement error in the dependent variable should be less of a
concern (see Table A-11).
Fifth, one may be concerned that the results on the role of input risk may be driven by
omitted variables correlated with CV Productivityi,c. Table A-12 shows that the results of
Table 2 are robust to including additional controls that vary at the input industry-country
level. We have also included input industry-country sector fixed effects, exploiting cross-firm
variation to identify the role of input risk. In particular, we have used information about the
quality of a firm’s management practices. We would expect the option value of integration to
be larger for firms with better management practices, to the extent that these practices make it
easier to enforce adaptation of production decisions and monitor suppliers under centraliza-
tion. Indeed, the results of Table A-13 show that the coefficient of the interaction between CV
Productivityi,c and Managementf is positive and significant. Crucially, this result is robust
to including input sector-country fixed effects to account for omitted variable concerns (see
columns 5 and 10).
Finally, we have experimented with alternative measures of uncertainty in the ability of
input suppliers: the cross-sectional standard-deviation of stock market returns and the cross-
sectional standard-deviation of real sales growth; as described in Section 3.3, these measures
are only available for the United States. In Table A-14, we verify that our results are robust
to focusing on US firms in our matched sample, for which we can use the three uncertainty
measures (CV Productivityi, SD Stock Returnsi and SD Output Growthi). Notice that the
number of observations is much smaller than in our benchmark regressions (less than 4,000
observations when using SD Output Growthi, compared to almost 250,000 observations in
Table 2). Also, given that the uncertainty measures vary at the input industry level (rather
than at the input industry-country level), we cannot include input and country fixed effects.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of Table A-14 confirm our model’s predictions
about integration choices: final good producers are more likely to integrate inputs when the
capability of suppliers in the upstream sector is more uncertain (the coefficients of the three
uncertainty measures are always positive and significant); and final good producers are more
likely to produce in house more important inputs (the coefficient of the variable IOij is aways
positive and significant).44
44The results are unaffected if we include the firm-level controls: the coefficients of our main variables of interest
remain positive and significant; of the firm controls, only Employmentf has a significant (positive) coefficient.
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4.3 Alternative Mechanisms
Our empirical analysis establishes the following regularities:
1. Firms that delegate more tend to be more vertically integrated.
2. Firms are more likely to integrate “riskier” inputs, i.e., industries in which supplier
productivity is more dispersed.
3. Final good producers are more likely to delegate decisions to integrated suppliers of
more important inputs.
4. Final good producers are more likely to integrate suppliers of more important inputs.
These results are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, in which integration
enhances efficiency and creates a real option for HQ to retain control or delegate according
to comparative advantage. Below we discuss other possible explanations for our findings.
The covariation of delegation and integration might be rationalized by models in which
headquarter’s attention is a scarce corporate resource (e.g., Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1991;
Aghion and Tirole, 1995). If vertical integration increases the scope of decisions in a firm,
HQ may simply need to cede control to lower-level managers.
We believe that theories of limited managerial capacity do not provide a rationale for our
empirical findings. There are three reasons for this. First, the positive correlation between
delegation and integration is robust to controlling for the size of the firm as captured by its
total number of employees.
Second, these theories would view delegation and management as substitutes, to the ex-
tent that good management reduces headquarters’ overload. To address this, we have included
in regression (9) controls for the quality of a plant’s management practices. The results re-
ported in Table 3 suggest that delegation and management are complements rather than sub-
stitutes: the better the plant’s management practices the higher is the degree of autonomy
given to plant-level managers.45 Also, if good management reduces headquarters’ overload,
the partial correlation between delegation and vertical integration should become larger once
we control for the quality of management. Instead, we find that the coefficient of Vertical
Integrationf becomes smaller when we control for management.46
45We have also tried substituting the variable Managementp with its four components (see footnote 25 for their
definition). In these specifications, we find that only the management practices related to providing targets and
incentives to personnel (Targetsp, and Incentivesp) are significantly correlated with the degree of autonomy
granted to the plant manager.
46The coefficients of Vertical Integrationf reported in columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) are statistically different from
each other at the 5% level (10% level).
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The third reason for skepticism is that theories of limited managerial capacity have little
to say about the other empirical regularities, particularly how the riskiness and technological
importance of the inputs affect integration choices.
Table 3
Delegation Choices, Controlling for Management
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vertical Integrationf 0.517** 0.504** 0.473* 0.441*
(0.249) (0.249) (0.253) (0.253)
log(Employmentf ) -0.086** -0.076* -0.100** -0.089**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045)
log(Agef ) 0.035* 0.033 0.048** 0.046**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
log(Employmentp) 0.111*** 0.086*** 0.113*** 0.089*** *
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
log(% Workforce with College Degreep) 0.055*** 0.042*** 0.056*** 0.044**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Managementp 0.087*** 0.083***
(0.021) (0.022)
IOij 0.949** 0.940**
(0.444) (0.444)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes Yes
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Noise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,444 3,444 3,179 3,179
Notes: The dependent variable is Delegationf,p,i,j,c, the degree of autonomy granted to plant p (with primary activity i, located in country
c) by the parent firm f (with primary activity j). Vertical integrationf is the vertical integration index of firm f . Employmentf measures
the firm’s employment, Agef is the number of years since its establishment, Employmentp is the plant’s employment, and % Workforce
with College Degreep is the percentage of the plan’t employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Managementp is the normalized z-score
capturing the quality of the plant’s management practices. Output and input fixed effects are respectively the primary activities of the
parent and of the plant (defined at 3-digits SIC). Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
We have described our model as exhibiting a kind of “supply assurance” motive for inte-
gration: the ability to centralize control under integration affords the HQ at least a moderate
level of input value, even if her supplier turns out to be quite inept. Note that it is interim un-
certainty (after production begins, but before the input is produced) that is hedged here, and
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it predicts our empirical finding that input risk increases integration propensities. But that
result might be explained by other, “ex-post,” forms of supply assurance (e.g., Carlton, 1979;
Bolton and Whinston, 1993; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 2002). In these models, firms also
integrate in order to guarantee a stable supply of inputs. But the assurance motive for integra-
tion is driven by uncertainty resolved after input production (e.g., product demand), possibly
augmented by the supplier’s hold-up behavior. Broadly speaking, one would expect less in-
tegration when there is less of a risk of suppliers coming up short, whether for technological
or behavioral reasons. This might then provide an explanation for the positive coefficient of
CV Productivityi,c in our regressions.
Typically, the ex-post assurance motives for integration would be mitigated when there
are many suppliers in an input industry. Against this hypothesis, when we focus on input
industries in which there are many suppliers, we find that the coefficient of CV Productivityi,c
remains positive and highly significant (see Table A-8), albeit with somewhat diminished
magnitude (the difference in the coefficients is significant at the 5% level). This is also true
in the specification in which we include firm fixed effects, which account for demand for
inputs by other firms in the same country-output sector (column 4), while output industry
fixed effects in other columns control for product market uncertainty.
Thus, while ex-post supply assurance models may go part way toward explaining the
response of integration to uncertainty, there remains considerable scope for interim assurance
to motivate integration. Of course, a more fundamental difference between our model and
the ex-post assurance theories is that they have little to say about our empirical findings
concerning delegation levels and their interplay with firm boundaries.
5 Conclusion
Organizations are complicated. Understanding them entails simplification, and a lot has been
learned by isolating distinct organizational design elements. But there are costs to isolation.
To take a salient example, based on “one-dimensional” organizational models, one might ex-
pect non-integration and delegation to covary positively, given that both seem to put decisions
as far removed from the “center” as possible.
Yet non-integration and delegation are conceptually distinct. Non-integration is formal,
delegation informal.47 And if there are many types of decisions that must be made, non-
47The law treats delegation and non-integration differently. It regulates and registers asset sales and adjudicates
disputes between parties who hold separate titles. Once they are integrated, however, the parties largely forego
the intervention of the law in most of their disputes, and via the business judgment rule, are immune to its
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integration is at best a blunt, all-or-nothing instrument for achieving “decentralized” decision-
making. On the other hand, a manager with considerable authority could fine tune decentral-
ization by delegating some decisions and retaining control over others. In this paper, we
develop a simple theoretical model that captures these different dimensions of organizational
design and show, theoretically and empirically, that delegation and non-integration are likely
to move in opposite directions.
Our framework also suggest that, on top of enhancing productive efficiency, integration
creates an option value: a producer can delegate key decisions to an integrated supplier, if he
turns out to be of high capability, and retain control of these decisions otherwise. Such an
option is not available under non-integration wherein the producer is entirely reliant on the
supplier’s capabilities.
We hope the exercise is an encouraging illustration of what can be learned by bring-
ing together disparate elements of organizational design, as well as datasets rich enough to
measure them, within a single framework. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of un-
derstanding the conceptual distinction between integration and centralization, as well as their
interrelatedness. For example, the empirical literature on delegation studies the degree of
autonomy granted to integrated plants/suppliers. Our theoretical model and empirical results
suggest that integrated suppliers are more likely to operate in riskier industries, to produce
more important inputs, and to have more productive HQs. These selection effects can bias the
conclusions of empirical studies on delegation, which abstract from prior integration choices.
Some of our empirical results also raise new questions about the interactions of integra-
tion and delegation with other aspects of organization. For example, we find that firms in
which central headquarters give more autonomy to their subordinates tend to adopt better
management practices. Moreover, the propensity to integrate in the face of greater supply un-
certainty is enhanced by better management practices. It would be interesting to explore the
mechanisms behind these apparent complementarities between management and the aspects
of organizational design we have considered here, both theoretically and empirically. More
broadly, an understanding of how choices of management practices depend on the organiza-
tional environment, and how these decisions affect firm performance, is an important avenue
for future research.
intervention in many matters, in particular who will make various business decisions.
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Appendix
A-1 Multiple Tasks Extension
Without loss of generality, set pi = 1. As stated in the text, suppose that adaptation involves
a fixed set T of steps or tasks t, and that the overall value of the input is the average of the
values of each task. The capability of supplier S on each task is y + t, where the t are
i.i.d. across t and independent of y, with distribution G(), density g(), and E = 0. The t
as well as the single draw of y are realized and observed before task assignment. We think
of the distribution of task-specific capability G as independent of input i, while the overall
capability F depends on i as before. HQ always has capability 1.
Centralization yields payoff to HQ of A/T . Delegation yields (1/T )A(y + t)(1− (st −
ht)
2) at cost (1/T )(1 − ht)2 to HQ, (1/T )cs2t to S. As before st = 0 so now delegation of
task t yields (A(y + t))2/(1 + A(y + t)), provided y + t > 0 (there is never delegation if
y + t ≤ 0). In other words, y + t replaces y, and delegation occurs when y + t > y∗(A).
Since xt ≡ y + t has distribution given by the convolution:
C(x) ≡
∫ ∞
0
G(x− y)f(y)dy,
the centralization probability C(y∗) is increasing in y∗, therefore decreasing in A (C ′(y∗) =∫∞
0
g(y∗ − y)f(y)dy > 0). ) So the probability of delegation 1− C(y∗) is increasing in A.
In this setting, we can derive two continuous delegation measures: the number and the
fraction of tasks delegated. Both are binomial r.v.’s with parameters (1−C(y∗), T ), stochas-
tically increasing in A.
Of course this formulation modifies the value of integration somewhat. For each task, HQ
obtains value:
vt(A, y + t) =
A, if y + t ≤ y∗(A)vD(A, 1, y + t), if y + t > y∗(A).
Under non-integration the adaptation tasks do not enter, since there is no adaptation; in par-
ticular, non-integration’s value is still governed by the random variable y, V N remains AEy.
We can then reformulate our main results as follows:
Proposition 3. In the tasks model, the propensity to integrate increases with A and its option
value increases in the riskiness of F (y).
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Proof. Using the change of variable xt = y + t, there is integration if:
1
T
∑
t
Evt(A, xt)− V N > C(y∗(A))c+ φ. (11)
Integration increases with A. As in the baseline model, C(y∗(A)) is a decreasing func-
tion of A. Therefore, it is enough to show that the left hand side is an increasing func-
tion of A, a sufficient condition being that each term Evt(A, xt) − V N is increasing in A;
since ∂AV N = Ey ≤ 1, it is enough that ∂AEvD(A, xt) exceed 1. Since Evt(A, xt) =
AC(y∗(A))+
∫∞
y∗(A) v
D(A, 1, xt)dC(xt), the same argument as in footnote 8, using convexity
and zero-at-zero of vDin A, and supermodularity in (A, xt), yields the result.
Option value increases with riskiness. Each term in the option value sum 1
T
∑
t Evt(A, xt)−
V N can be written
∫∞
−∞ g(t)
[∫∞
0
max{A, vD(A, 1, y + t)}f(y)dy
]
dt−V N . For each fixed
t, our argument in section 2.4 ensures that the integral in brackets, is increasing in the riski-
ness of y, while V N remains constant. It then follows that the expectation with respect to t
of this integral, hence the left hand side of (11), is also increasing in the riskiness of y.
For the propensity to integrate to increase with risk, the challenges are similar to those
in the baseline model to ensure that the cost of integration C(y∗(A))c does not increase too
quickly. Note though that now a simpler sufficient condition can be invoked for Proposition
2: the distribution of the noiseG(t) has a decreasing density. Indeed, in this caseG(x−y) is
concave in y, and therefore riskier F (y) distributions reduce the probability of centralization
C(y∗(A)) =
∫∞
0
G(y∗(A)− y)dF (y).
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A-2 Descriptive Statistics
Table A-1
Descriptive Statistics of Matched Sample
Mean Median Standard deviation N. observations N. firms
Delegationp 0.13 0.07 0.99 3,444 2,661
Employmentp 254.11 150.00 367.23 3,387 2,661
% Workers with College Degreep 15.20 10.00 16.34 3,225 2,661
Managementp 3.05 3.06 0.65 3,444 2,661
Agef 40.08 30.00 35.02 3,444 2,661
Vertical Integrationf 0.10 0.08 0.08 3,444 2,661
Integrationf,i 0.01 0.00 0.10 249,479 2,661
CV Productivityi,c 2.88 1.78 4.69 249,479 2,661
IOi,j 0.04 0.04 0.036 249,479 2,661
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics of all the variables used in our main regressions on delegation and
integration choices (see Tables 1- 3 in the body of the paper). Delegationp, is the overall autonomy index of plant p.
Employmentp measures the plant’s employment. % Workforce with College Degreep is the percentage of the plant’s
employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Managementp is the normalized z-score capturing the quality of the
plant’s management practices. Employmentf measures the number of employees of firm f . Agef is the number of
years since the firm was established. Vertical integrationf is the vertical integration index of firm f . Integrationf,i is
a dummy equal to 1 if firm f integrates input i within its boundaries. CV Productivityi,c is the coefficient of variation
of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i located in country c. IOi,j is the IO coefficient
capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j.
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Table A-2
Observations by Country
Country Number of Observations Percentage
Argentina 100 2.90
Australia 133 3.86
Brazil 234 6.79
Canada 207 6.01
Chile 95 2.76
China 64 1.86
France 212 6.16
Germany 224 6.50
Greece 104 3.02
India 104 3.02
Italy 106 3.08
Ireland 75 2.18
Japan 102 2.96
Mexico 86 2.50
New Zealand 118 3.43
Poland 27 0.78
Portugal 78 2.26
Sweden 330 9.58
United Kingdom 432 12.54
United States 613 17.80
Notes: The table reports the number of observations by country
for our matched sample of firms.
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Figure A-1: Survey on Delegation
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Question D3: “Where are decisions taken on new product introductions—at the plant, at the CHQ or both”?
For Questions D1, D3, and D4 any score can be given, but the scoring guide is only provided for scores of 1, 3, and 5.
Question D1: “To hire a FULL-TIME PERMANENT SHOPFLOOR worker what agreement would your plant need from CHQ (Central Head Quarters)?”
Probe until you can accurately score the question—for example if they say “It is my decision, but I need sign-off from corporate HQ.” ask “How often would sign-off be given?”
Scoring grid: No authority—even for replacement hires
Requires sign-off from CHQ based on the business 
case. Typically agreed (i.e. about 80% or 90% of 
the time).
Complete authority—it is my decision entirely
Question D2: “What is the largest CAPITAL INVESTMENT your plant could make without prior authorization from CHQ?”
Notes: (a) Ignore form-filling
            (b) Please cross check any zero response by asking “What about buying a new computer—would that be possible?” and then probe….
            (c) Challenge any very large numbers (e.g. >$¼m in US) by asking “To confirm your plant could spend $X on a new piece of equipment without prior clearance from CHQ?”
            (d) Use the national currency and do not omit zeros (i.e. for a U.S. firm twenty thousand dollars would be 20000).
Probe until you can accurately score the question—for example if they say “It is complex, we both play a role,” ask “Could you talk me through the process for a recent product innovation?”
Scoring grid: All new product introduction decisions are taken at the CHQ
New product introductions are jointly determined 
by the plant and CHQ
All new product introduction decisions taken at the 
plant level
Question D5: “Is the CHQ on the site being interviewed”?
Notes: The electronic survey, training materials and survey video footage are available on www.worldmanagementsurvey.com
Question D4: “How much of sales and marketing is carried out at the plant level (rather than at the CHQ)”?
Probe until you can accurately score the question. Also take an average score for sales and marketing if they are taken at different levels.
Scoring grid: None—sales and marketing is all run by CHQ Sales and marketing decisions are split between the plant and CHQ The plant runs all sales and marketing
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Figure A-2: Management Practices
206    Journal of Economic Perspectives
Table 1
The Management Practice Dimensions
Categories Score from 1–5 based on:
1) Introduction of modern 
manufacturing techniques
What aspects of manufacturing have been formally introduced, 
including just-in-time delivery from suppliers, autonomation, 
fl exible manpower, support systems, attitudes, and behavior?
2) Rationale for introduction of 
modern manufacturing 
techniques
Were modern manufacturing techniques adopted just because 
others were using them, or are they linked to meeting business 
objectives like reducing costs and improving quality?
3) Process problem 
documentation
Are process improvements made only when problems arise, or are 
they actively sought out for continuous improvement as part of 
a normal business process?
4) Performance tracking Is tracking ad hoc and incomplete, or is performance continually 
tracked and communicated to all staff?
5) Performance review Is performance reviewed infrequently and only on a 
success/failure scale, or is performance reviewed continually 
with an expectation of continuous improvement?
6) Performance dialogue In review/performance conversations, to what extent is the 
purpose, data, agenda, and follow-up steps (like coaching) 
clear to all parties?
7) Consequence management To what extent does failure to achieve agreed objectives carry 
consequences, which can include retraining or reassignment to 
other jobs?
8) Target balance Are the goals exclusively fi nancial, or is there a balance of fi nancial 
and nonfi nancial targets?
9) Target interconnection Are goals based on accounting value, or are they based on 
shareholder value in a way that works through business units and 
ultimately is connected to individual performance expectations?
10) Target time horizon Does top management focus mainly on the short term, or does it 
visualize short-term targets as a “staircase” toward the main 
focus on long-term goals?
11) Targets are stretching Are goals too easy to achieve, especially for some “sacred cows” 
areas of the fi rm, or are goals demanding but attainable for all 
parts of the fi rm?
12) Performance clarity Are performance measures ill-defi ned, poorly understood, and 
private, or are they well-defi ned, clearly communicated, and 
made public?
13) Managing human capital To what extent are senior managers evaluated and held 
accountable for attracting, retaining, and developing talent 
throughout the organization?
14) Rewarding high 
performance
To what extent are people in the fi rm rewarded equally 
irrespective of performance level, or are rewards related to 
performance and effort?
15) Removing poor performers Are poor performers rarely removed, or are they retrained and/or 
moved into different roles or out of the company as soon as the 
weakness is identifi ed?
16) Promoting high performers Are people promoted mainly on the basis of tenure, or does the 
fi rm actively identify, develop, and promote its top performers?
17) Attracting human capital Do competitors offer stronger reasons for talented people to join 
their companies, or does a fi rm provide a wide range of reasons 
to encourage talented people to join?
18) Retaining human capital Does the fi rm do relatively little to retain top talent or do whatever 
it takes to retain top talent when they look likely to leave?
Note: The full set of questions that are asked to score each dimension are included in Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2006).
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A-3 Robustness Checks
Table A-3
Delegation Choices (4-digits SIC Industry FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vertical Integrationf 0.725*** 0.792** 0.665** 0.768*** 0.821*** 0.689**
(0.277) (0.314) (0.313) (0.275) (0.314) (0.313)
log(Employmentf ) -0.105** -0.096*
(0.053) (0.053)
log(Agef ) 0.037 0.040
(0.026) (0.026)
log(Employmentp) 0.116*** 0.123***
(0.028) (0.028)
log(% Workforce with College Degreep) 0.060*** 0.061***
(0.020) (0.020)
IOij 0.898** 1.185* 1.369**
(0.457) (0.696) (0.685)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Noise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,444 3,257 3,257 3,179 3,179 3,179
Notes: The dependent variable, Delegationf,p, is the overall autonomy index of plant p (belonging to firm f ). Vertical integrationf is the vertical
integration index of firm f . Employmentf measures the firm’s employment, Agef is the number of years since its establishment, Employmentp
is the plant’s employment, and % Workforce with College Degreep is the percentage of the plant’s employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher.
IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j. Output and input fixed effects are respectively the
primary activities of the parent and of the plant (defined at 4-digits SIC). Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table A-4
Delegation Choices (Largest 10 Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vertical Integrationf 0.867*** 0.653** 0.527* 0.776*** 0.514* 0.363
(0.287) (0.305) (0.305) (0.286) (0.306) (0.306)
log(Employmentf ) -0.049 -0.052
(0.056) (0.058)
log(Agef ) 0.028 0.047*
(0.024) (0.024)
log(Employmentp) 0.115*** 0.115***
(0.028) (0.029)
log(% Workforce with College Degreep) 0.054*** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.019)
IOij 1.358*** 1.722*** 1.778***
(0.454) (0.560) (0.548)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Noise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,369 2,369 2,369
Notes: The dependent variable, Delegationf,p, is the overall autonomy index of plant p (belonging to firm f ). Vertical integrationf is the vertical
integration index of firm f . Employmentf measures the firm’s employment, Agef is the number of years since its establishment, Employmentp
is the plant’s employment, and % Workforce with College Degreep is the percentage of the plant’s employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher.
IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j. Output and input fixed effects are respectively the
primary activities of the parent and of the plant (defined at 4-digits SIC). Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table A-5
Delegation Choices (Controlling for Labor Productivity of the Parent Firm)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vertical Integrationf 0.554** 0.556** 0.473* 0.462*
(0.249) (0.251) (0.253) (0.256)
log(Employmentf ) -0.086** -0.086** -0.100** -0.100**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044)
log(Agef ) 0.035* 0.034 0.048** 0.047**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
log(Productivityf ) 0.004 0.008
(0.014) (0.015)
log(Employmentp) 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
log(% Workforce with College Degreep) 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.055***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
IOij 0.949** 0.949**
(0.444) (0.444)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes Yes
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Noise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,444 3,444 3,179 3,179
Notes: The dependent variable, Delegationf,p, is the overall autonomy index of plant p (belonging to firm f ).
Vertical integrationf is the vertical integration index of firm f . Employmentf measures the firm’s employment,
Agef is the number of years since its establishment, Employmentp is the plant’s employment, and % Workforce with
College Degreep is the percentage of the plant’s employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Productivityf is equal
to the firm’s sales per employee. IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of
good j. Output and input fixed effects are respectively the primary activities of the parent and of the plant (defined at
4-digits SIC). Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table A-6
Delegation and Vertical Integration (Single-plant Firms)
(1) (2)
Vertical Integrationf 1.010** 1.016**
(0.447) (0.445)
log(Employmentf ) -0.099
(0.066)
log(Agef ) 0.000
(0.036)
log(% Workforce with College Degreep) 0.068***
(0.025)
Country FE Yes Yes
Output FE Yes Yes
Noise controls Yes Yes
N 1,480 1,480
Notes: The dependent variable, Delegationf,p, is the overall autonomy index of
plant p (belonging to firm f ). Vertical integrationf is the vertical integration index of
firm f . Employmentf measures the firm’s employment, Agef is the number of years
since its establishment, and % Workforce with College Degreep is the percentage of
the plan’t employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Output fixed effects are the
primary activities of firm (defined at 3-digits SIC). Standard errors clustered at the
firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table A-7
Integration Choices (Winsorizing Suppliers’ Productivity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CV Productivityi,c 0.00266** 0.00283** 0.00298** 0.00293** 0.00274** 0.00289** 0.00304*** 0.00297**
(0.00118) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00115) (0.00118) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00115)
log(Employmentf ) 0.00682*** 0.00683***
(0.00040) (0.00040)
log(1+ Agef ) -0.00009 -0.00012
(0.00029) (0.00029)
IOij 0.08019*** 0.13419*** 0.13679*** 0.14607***
(0.01222) (0.01554) (0.01542) (0.01657)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes -
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes - No Yes Yes -
Firm FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 242,923 242,923 242,923 242,923 242,923 242,923 242,923 242,923
Notes: The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i,c, a dummy equal to 1 if firm f (producing final product j and located in country c) integrates input iwithin its boundaries.
CV Productivityi,c is the coefficient of variation of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i located in country c. Employmentf measures firm
employment, and Agef is the number of years since the firm’s establishment. IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j. All
regressions include Mean Productivityi,c as a control. Standard errors clustered at the input level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels.
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Table A-8
Integration Choices (50+ Suppliers per Input Sector)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CV Productivityi,c 0.00050*** 0.00046*** 0.00045*** 0.00044*** 0.00050*** 0.00046*** 0.00045*** 0.00044***
(0.00013) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00013)
log(Employmentf ) 0.00812*** 0.00813***
(0.00049) (0.00049)
log(1+ Agef ) -0.00016 -0.00019
(0.00036) (0.00036)
IOij 0.09569*** 0.19432*** 0.19715*** 0.21395***
(0.01698) (0.02344) (0.02321) (0.02621)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes -
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes - No Yes Yes -
Firm FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 176,347 176,347 176,347 176,347 176,347 176,347 176,347 176,347
Notes: The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i,c, a dummy equal to 1 if firm f (producing final product j and located in country c) integrates input i within its boundaries. CV
Productivityi,c is the coefficient of variation of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i located in country c. Employmentf measures firm employment,
and Agef is the number of years since the firm’s establishment. IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j. All regressions include
Mean Productivityi,c as a control. Standard errors clustered at the input level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table A-9
Integration Choices (Largest 10 Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CV Productivityi,c 0.00053*** 0.00050*** 0.00049*** 0.00049*** 0.00053*** 0.00049*** 0.00049*** 0.00049***
(0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013)
log(Employmentf ) 0.00524*** 0.00524***
(0.00036) (0.00036)
log(1+ Agef ) 0.00053* 0.00053*
(0.00031) (0.00031)
log(% Workforce with College Degreep) 0.00026 0.00024
(0.00020) (0.00020)
IOij 0.06011*** 0.14177*** 0.14198*** 0.15384***
(0.01472) (0.01987) (0.01976) (0.02135)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes -
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes - No Yes Yes -
Firm FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 171,729 171,729 171,729 171,729 171,729 171,729 171,729 171,729
Notes: The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i,c, a dummy equal to 1 if firm f (producing final product j and located in country c) integrates input i within its boundaries. CV Productivityi,c is the
coefficient of variation of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i located in country c. Employmentf measures firm employment, Agef is the number of years since the firm’s
establishment, and % Workforce with College Degreep is the fraction of workers with a Bachelor’s degree or higher (at the plant-level). IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the
production of good j. All regressions include Mean Productivityi,c as a control. Standard errors clustered at the input level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
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Table A-10
Integration Choices (WorldBase Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CV Productivityi,c 0.00075*** 0.00075*** 0.00075*** 0.00075*** 0.00075*** 0.00074*** 0.00074*** 0.00074***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
log(Employmentf ) 0.00145*** 0.00144***
(0.00013) (0.00013)
log(1+ Agef ) 0.00018 0.00017
(0.00011) (0.00011)
IOij 0.14985*** 0.17906*** 0.17888*** 0.20304***
(0.01342) (0.01447) (0.01446) (0.01611)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes -
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes - No Yes Yes -
Firm FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 6,644,884 6,644,884 6,644,884 6,644,884 6,644,884 6,644,884 6,644,884 6,644,884
Notes: The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i,c, a dummy equal to 1 if firm f (producing final product j and located in country c) integrates input i within its boundaries. CV
Productivityi,c is the coefficient of variation of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i located in country c. Employmentf measures firm employment,
and Agef is the number of years since the firm’s establishment. IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j. All regressions include
Mean Productivityi,c as a control. Standard errors clustered at the input level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
52
Table A-11
Integration Choices (WorldBase Sample, Single-Plant Firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CV Productivityi,c 0.00070*** 0.00070*** 0.00070*** 0.00070*** 0.00070*** 0.00069*** 0.00069*** 0.00069***
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009)
log(Employmentf ) 0.00011 0.00010
(0.00010) (0.00010)
log(1+ Agef ) 0.00015 0.00014
(0.00012) (0.00012)
IOij 0.14390*** 0.17148*** 0.17147*** 0.19426***
(0.01365) (0.01475) (0.01475) (0.01646)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes -
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes - No Yes Yes -
Firm FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 6,027,632 6,027,632 6,027,632 6,027,632 6,027,632 6,027,632 6,027,632 6,027,632
Notes: The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i,c, a dummy equal to 1 if firm f (producing final product j and located in country c) integrates input i within its boundaries. CV
Productivityi,c is the coefficient of variation of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i located in country c. Employmentf measures firm employment,
and Agef is the number of years since the firm’s establishment. IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j. All regressions include
Mean Productivityi,c as a control. Standard errors clustered at the input level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table A-12
Integration Choices (Additional Controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CV Productivityi,c 0.00062*** 0.00057*** 0.00056*** 0.00056*** 0.00062*** 0.00057*** 0.00056*** 0.00056***
(0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00015)
Mean Firm Employmenti,c -0.00010 -0.00008 -0.00016 0.00010 -0.00009 -0.00006 -0.00014 0.00014
(0.00035) (0.00034) (0.00032) (0.00033) (0.00035) (0.00034) (0.00033) (0.00034)
Mean Firm Salesi,c 0.00028 0.00050 0.00028 0.00020 0.00024 0.00048 0.00026 0.00016
(0.00099) (0.00092) (0.00087) (0.00090) (0.00100) (0.00094) (0.00088) (0.00091)
log(Employmentf ) 0.00671*** 0.00672***
(0.00040) (0.00040)
log(1+ Agef ) -0.00007 -0.00009
(0.00028) (0.00028)
IOij 0.07701*** 0.12625*** 0.12828*** 0.13752***
(0.01188) (0.01495) (0.01485) (0.01592)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes -
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output FE No Yes Yes - No Yes Yes -
Firm FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 249,471 249,471 249471 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471
Notes: The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i,c, a dummy equal to 1 if firm f (producing final product j and located in country c) integrates input i within its boundaries. CV
Productivityi,c is the coefficient of variation of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i located in country c. Mean Firm Employmenti,c and Mean Firm Salesi,c
are average employment and sales for firms producing good iand in country c. Employmentf measures firm employment, and Agef is the number of years since the firm’s establishment.
IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance of input i in the production of good j. All regressions include Mean Productivityi,c as a control. Standard errors clustered at the input
level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table A-13
Integration Choices (Interactions with Management)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CV Productivityi,c 0.00034*** 0.00026** 0.00034*** 0.00028** 0.00033*** 0.00026** 0.00034*** 0.00028**
(0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00011)
CV Productivityi,c ×Managementf 0.00042*** 0.00034*** 0.00021*** 0.00024*** 0.00029*** 0.00042*** 0.00035*** 0.00021*** 0.00024*** 0.00029***
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00008)
Managementf -0.00010*** -0.00009*** -0.00004*** -0.00010*** -0.00009*** -0.00004***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
log(Employmentf ) 0.00640*** 0.00641***
(0.00037) (0.00037)
log(1+ Agef ) 0.00003 0.00001
(0.00028) (0.00028)
IOij 0.07437*** 0.12550*** 0.12781*** 0.13765*** 0.14862***
(0.01177) (0.01492) (0.01483) (0.01592) (0.01671)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes - - Yes Yes Yes - -
Input FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Output FE No Yes Yes - - No Yes Yes - -
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Input-Country FE No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
N 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471 247,922 249,471 249,471 249,471 249,471 247,922
Notes: The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i,c, a dummy equal to 1 if firm f (producing final product j and located in country c) integrates input i within its boundaries. CV Productivityi,c is the
coefficient of variation of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i located in country c. Mean Firm Employmenti,c and Mean Firm Salesi,c are average employment and sales
for firms producing good iand in country c. Employmentf measures firm employment, and Agef is the number of years since the firm’s establishment. IOi,j is the IO coefficient capturing the importance
of input i in the production of good j. All regressions include Mean Productivityi,c as a control. Standard errors clustered at the input level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table A-14
Integration Choices (Alternative Uncertainty Measures, United States)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV Productivityi 0.00040** 0.00039**
(0.00017) (0.00016)
SD Stock Returnsi 0.69947** 0.69402**
(0.27097) (0.29573)
SD Output Growthi 0.15959* 0.15638*
(0.08377) (0.08427)
IOij 0.30568*** 0.17544** 0.30305***
(0.08314) (0.08791) (0.08529)
Output Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,720 6,717 3,901 3,892 6,720 6,717
Notes: The dependent variable is Integrationf,j,i, a dummy equal to 1 if firm f (producing final product j) integrates input i within
its boundaries. CV Productivityi is the coefficient of variation of labor productivity of the independent suppliers in input industry i
located in country c. SD Stock Returnsi is the standard-deviation of the mean annual returns across firms in input industry i. SD Output
Growthi is the standard-deviation of real sales growth across firms in input industry i. All regressions include Mean Productivityi,c
as a control. Standard errors clustered at the input level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels.
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